Everything but the kitchen sink: how (not) to give a plenitudinarian solution to the paradox of flexible origin essentialism

Philosophical Studies 179 (1):133-161 (2021)
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Abstract

I explore options for a plenitudinarian solution to the Paradox of Flexible Origin Essentialism, taking as my unlikely starting point the views of Sarah-Jane Leslie, who holds that if plenitudinarianism is true, then there is in fact no paradox to be solved, only the illusion of one. The first three sections are expository: Sect. 1 on plenitudinarianism, Sect. 2 on the paradox, and Sect. 3 on Leslie’s views about how plenitudinarianism bears on the paradox. In Sect. 4, I reject the contention that there is no paradox and critically explore three options for a plenitudinarian solution. In Sect. 5, I argue that the plenitudinarian ought to endorse a fourth option. In Sect. 6, I consider an objection. I endorse neither plenitudinarianism nor its denial; the main aim of the paper is to argue that for one who does endorse plenitudinarianism, the best solution to the Paradox of Flexible Origin Essentialism is clear.

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Teresa Robertson Ishii
University of California at Santa Barbara

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References found in this work

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