Metaphilosophy 49 (1-2):137-152 (2018)

Authors
Cristina Roadevin
University of Sheffield
Abstract
This paper argues that hypocritical blame renders blame inappropriate. Someone should not express her blame if she is guilty of the same thing for which she is blaming others, in the absence of an admission of fault. In failing to blame herself for the same violations of norms she condemns in another, the hypocrite evinces important moral faults, which undermine her right to blame. The hypocrite refuses or culpably fails to admit her own mistakes, while at the same time demands that others admit theirs. The paper argues that this lack of reciprocity—expecting others to take morality seriously by apologizing for their faults, without one doing the same in return—is what makes hypocritical blame unfair.
Keywords blame  hypocrisy  moral standing  reciprocity
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DOI 10.1111/meta.12281
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References found in this work BETA

Hypocrisy and the Standing to Blame.Kyle G. Fritz & Daniel Miller - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (1):118-139.
Hypocrisy, Moral Address, and the Equal Standing of Persons.R. Jay Wallace - 2010 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 38 (4):307-341.
Casting the First Stone: Who Can, and Who Can’T, Condemn the Terrorists?G. A. Cohen - 2006 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 58:113-136.
Responsibility and Reproach.Cheshire Calhoun - 1989 - Ethics 99 (2):389-406.

View all 15 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

The Commitment Account of Hypocrisy.Benjamin Rossi - 2018 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (3):553-567.
The Unique Badness of Hypocritical Blame.Kyle G. Fritz & Daniel Miller - 2019 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 6.
Hypocrisy is Vicious, Value-Expressing Inconsistency.Benjamin Rossi - 2020 - The Journal of Ethics 25 (1):57-80.

View all 15 citations / Add more citations

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