The Fallacy of Corporate Moral Agency

Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands (2015)
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Abstract

This section aims to summarize and conclude Part I in the form of a taxonomy of legitimate and illegitimate corporate moral responsibility attributions. I believe we can categorise four types of corporate moral responsibility attributions two of which are legitimate and two which are illegitimate with regard to our concept of moral agency and our moral intuition of fairness

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Citations of this work

Zombies Incorporated.Olof Leffler - 2023 - Theoria 89 (5):640-659.
I, Volkswagen.Stephanie Collins - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly 72 (2):283-304.
Does the Machine Need a Ghost? Corporate Agents as Nonconscious Kantian Moral Agents.Kendy M. Hess - 2018 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 4 (1):67-86.
Business Ethics.Jeffrey Moriarty - 2016 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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References found in this work

Anarchy, State, and Utopia.Robert Nozick - 1974 - New York: Basic Books.
Justice as fairness: a restatement.John Rawls (ed.) - 2001 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Minds, brains, and programs.John Searle - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):417-57.
Freedom of the will and the concept of a person.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20.
Morals by agreement.David P. Gauthier - 1986 - New York: Oxford University Press.

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