Evidence does not equal knowledge

Philosophical Studies 153 (2):235-242 (2011)
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Timothy Williamson has argued that a person S ’s total evidence is constituted solely by propositions that S knows. This theory of evidence entails that a false belief can not be a part of S ’s evidence base for a conclusion. I argue by counterexample that this thesis (E = K for now) forces an implausible separation between what it means for a belief to be justified and rational from one’s perspective and what it means to base one’s beliefs on the evidence. Furthermore, I argue that E = K entails the implausible result that there are cases in which a well-evidenced belief necessarily can not serve as evidence for a further proposition.

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Aaron Rizzieri
Yavapai College

Citations of this work

There Is No Knowledge From Falsehood.Ian Schnee - 2015 - Episteme 12 (1):53-74.
No Evidence is False.Clayton Littlejohn - 2013 - Acta Analytica 28 (2):145-159.
Evidence and Knowledge.Clayton Littlejohn - 2011 - Erkenntnis 74 (2):241-262.

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References found in this work

Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210):105-116.
Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge.Laurence Bonjour - 1980 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5 (1):53-73.
Justification and truth.Stewart Cohen - 1984 - Philosophical Studies 46 (3):279--95.
Problems for Dogmatism.Roger White - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 131 (3):525-557.

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