Arrow’s theorem and theory choice

Synthese 191 (8):1847-1856 (2014)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In a recent paper (Okasha, Mind 120:83–115, 2011), Samir Okasha uses Arrow’s theorem to raise a challenge for the rationality of theory choice. He argues that, as soon as one accepts the plausibility of the assumptions leading to Arrow’s theorem, one is compelled to conclude that there are no adequate theory choice algorithms. Okasha offers a partial way out of this predicament by diagnosing the source of Arrow’s theorem and using his diagnosis to deploy an approach that circumvents it. In this paper I explain why, although Okasha is right to emphasise that Arrow’s result is the effect of an informational problem, he is not right to locate this problem at the level of the informational input of a theory choice rule. Once the informational problem is correctly located, Arrow’s theorem may be dismissed as a problem.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,386

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Arrow's theorem in judgment aggregation.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2007 - Social Choice and Welfare 29 (1):19-33.
Social Choice Theory and Deliberative Democracy: A Reconciliation.Christian List & John Dryzek - 2003 - British Journal of Political Science 33 (1):1-28.
A Note on Introducing a 'Zero-Line' of Welfare as an Escape-Route from Arrow's Theorem.Christian List - 2001 - Pacific Economic Review (Special Section in Honour of Amartya Sen) 6 (2):223-238.
Social choice and individual capabilities.Mozaffar Qizilbash - 2007 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 6 (2):169-192.
Independence of irrelevant alternatives revisited.Susumu Cato - 2014 - Theory and Decision 76 (4):511-527.

Analytics

Added to PP
2013-12-17

Downloads
73 (#221,304)

6 months
10 (#251,846)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?