Justified and Justifiable Beliefs: The Case of Question-Begging

Philosophical Studies 128 (3):565-583 (2006)
  Copy   BIBTEX


This paper discusses Lippert-Rasmussen’s [Philosophical Studies 104, (2001) 123–141] claim that there are reasonable question-begging arguments. It is first argued that his arguments devalue the distinction between justifiable and justified beliefs, a distinction that is important for the fallacy theory. Second, it is argued that the role of the argument in the discussed cases can be questioned. In addition, the role of second order beliefs is discussed.



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,991

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Beliefs and subdoxastic states.Stephen P. Stich - 1978 - Philosophy of Science 45 (December):499-518.
How to Be a Reasonable Dogmatist.James Vincent Pryor - 1997 - Dissertation, Princeton University
Yes, Virginia, Lemons are Yellow.Alex Byrne - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 108 (1-2):213-222.
Neorationalist epistemology.Douglas Odegard - 1997 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (3):567-584.
Neorationalist Epistemology.Douglas Odegard - 1997 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (3):567-584.


Added to PP

63 (#262,581)

6 months
7 (#491,772)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Juho Ritola
University of Turku

References found in this work

The Complete Works: The Rev. Oxford Translation.Jonathan Barnes (ed.) - 1984 - Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
Begging the question.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 1999 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (2):174 – 191.

View all 16 references / Add more references