Believing what we do not believe: Acquiescence to superstitious beliefs and other powerful intuitions

Psychological Review 123 (2):182-207 (2016)
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10.1037/rev0000017

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Superstitious Confabulations.Anna Ichino - 2020 - Topoi 39 (1):203-217.

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