Revising Up: Strengthening Classical Logic in the Face of Paradox

Philosophers' Imprint 13 (2013)
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Abstract

This paper provides a defense of the full strength of classical logic, in a certain form, against those who would appeal to semantic paradox or vagueness in an argument for a weaker logic. I will not argue that these paradoxes are based on mistaken principles; the approach I recommend will extend a familiar formulation of classical logic by including a fully transparent truth predicate and fully tolerant vague predicates. It has been claimed that these principles are not compatible with classical logic; I will argue, by both drawing on previous work and presenting new work in the same vein, that this is not so. We can combine classical logic with these intuitive principles, so long as we allow the result to be nontransitive. In the end, I hope the paper will help us to handle familiar paradoxes within classical logic; along the way, I hope to shed some light on what classical logic might be for

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David Ripley
Monash University

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