Inconstancy and inconsistency

In Petr Cintula, Christian Fermuller, Lluis Godo & Petr Hajek (eds.), Reasoning Under Vagueness. College Publications. pp. 41-58 (2011)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In everyday language, we can call someone ‘consistent’ to say that they’re reliable, that they don’t change over time. Someone who’s consistently on time is always on time. Similarly, we can call someone ‘inconsistent’ to say the opposite: that they’re changeable, mercurial. A student who receives inconsistent grades on her tests throughout a semester has performed better on some than on others. With our philosophy hats on, though, we mean something quite different by ‘consistent’ and ‘inconsistent’. Something consistent is simply something that’s not contradictory. There’s nothing contradictory about being on time, so anyone who’s on time at all is consistently on time, in this sense of ‘consistent’. And only a student with an unusual teacher can receive inconsistent grades on her tests throughout a semester, in this sense of ‘inconsistent’. In this paper, I’ll use ‘consistent’ and ‘inconsistent’ in their usual philosophical sense: to mark the second distinction. By contrast, I’ll use ‘constant’ and ‘inconstant’ to mark the first distinction. And although we can, should, and do sharply distinguish the two distinctions, they are related. In particular, they have both been used to account for some otherwise puzzling phenomena surrounding vague language. According to some theorists, vague language is inconstant. According to others, it is inconsistent. I do not propose here to settle these differences; only to get a bit clearer about what the differences amount to, and to show what it would take to settle..

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,202

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Inconsistency in classical electrodynamics.Mathias Frisch - 2004 - Philosophy of Science 71 (4):525-549.
On Using Inconsistent Expressions.Arvid Båve - 2012 - Erkenntnis 77 (1):133-148.
Inconsistency in the A-Theory.Nicholas J. J. Smith - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 156 (2):231 - 247.
Truth, the Liar, and Relativism.Kevin Scharp - 2013 - Philosophical Review 122 (3):427-510.
Expressivism and irrationality.Mark van Roojen - 1996 - Philosophical Review 105 (3):311-335.
Weak values and consistent histories in quantum theory.Ruth Kastner - 2004 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 35 (1):57-71.
Paraconsistency Everywhere.Greg Restall - 2002 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 43 (3):147-156.
Justice and Toleration.Jonathan L. Gorman - 2001 - The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 11:43-50.
Inconsistency: The coherence theorist’s nemesis?Mylan Engel - 1991 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 40 (1):113-130.

Analytics

Added to PP
2010-11-03

Downloads
76 (#210,613)

6 months
21 (#116,730)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

David Ripley
Monash University

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Vagueness, truth and logic.Kit Fine - 1975 - Synthese 30 (3-4):265-300.
An Introduction to Non-Classical Logic: From If to Is.Graham Priest - 2008 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Tolerant, Classical, Strict.Pablo Cobreros, Paul Egré, David Ripley & Robert van Rooij - 2012 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (2):347-385.
Logic for equivocators.David Lewis - 1982 - Noûs 16 (3):431-441.

View all 14 references / Add more references