Beyond truth and falsehood: the

Philosophical Studies:87-108 (2000)
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Abstract

Current epistemological dogma has it that the twin goalsof believing truths and avoiding errors exhaust our cognitive aspirations. On such a view, (call it the "TG view") the only evaluations that count as genuinely epistemological are those that evaluate something (a belief, believer, set of beliefs, a cognitive trait or process, etc.) in terms of its connection to these two goods. In particular, this view implies that all the epistemic value of knowledge must be derived from the value of the two goals cited in TG. I argue that this implication is false, and thus that the TG view must be abandoned. I propose a candidate to replace the TG view that makes better sense of the value of knowledge

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Wayne Riggs
University of Oklahoma

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