Verzeihen als normative Fähigkeit

Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie 48 (3):377-396 (2023)
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Abstract

In this paper, I try to determine the best way to understand forgiveness as a normative power. My suggestion is: to forgive a wrongdoer is to forswear the claim towards them to treat them as responsible for the relevant wrong. In defense of this claim, I contrast it with Susanne Boshammer’s and Christopher Bennett’s conceptions of forgiveness – and argue especially that it explains better how, in forgiving, we grant the wrongdoer a second chance.

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Stefan Riedener
University of Bergen

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