The liar, the strengthened liar, and bivalence

Erkenntnis 54 (2):195-203 (2001)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

A view often expressed is that to classify the liar sentence as neither true nor false is satisfactory for the simple liar but not for the strengthened liar. I argue that in fact it is equally unsatisfactory for both liars. I go on to discuss whether, nevertheless, Kripke''s theory of truth represents an advance on that of Tarski.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,386

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
86 (#192,854)

6 months
4 (#790,687)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Adam Rieger
University of Glasgow

Citations of this work

A New–old Characterisation of Logical Knowledge.Ivor Grattan-Guinness - 2012 - History and Philosophy of Logic 33 (3):245 - 290.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Logic, semantics, metamathematics.Alfred Tarski - 1956 - Oxford,: Clarendon Press. Edited by John Corcoran & J. H. Woodger.
Outline of a theory of truth.Saul Kripke - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (19):690-716.
Recent essays on truth and the liar paradox.Robert Lazarus Martin (ed.) - 1984 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Mathematical Logic as Based on the Theory of Types.Bertrand Russell - 1908 - American Journal of Mathematics 30 (3):222-262.

View all 8 references / Add more references