Moore’s Paradox, Introspection and Doxastic Logic

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 4 (4):215-227 (2015)
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Abstract

An analysis of Moore's paradox is given in doxastic logic. Logics arising from formalizations of various introspective principles are compared; one logic, K5c, emerges as privileged in the sense that it is the weakest to avoid Moorean belief. Moreover it has other attractive properties, one of which is that it can be justified solely in terms of avoiding false belief. Introspection is therefore revealed as less relevant to the Moorean problem than first appears

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Author's Profile

Adam Rieger
University of Glasgow

Citations of this work

Fitch's Paradox and Level-Bridging Principles.Weng Kin San - 2020 - Journal of Philosophy 117 (1):5-29.
Are Contradictions Believable?Yale Weiss - 2019 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 8 (1):42-49.
A Puzzle about Imagining Believing.Alon Chasid - 2021 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 13 (3):529-547.

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References found in this work

Knowledge and belief.Jaakko Hintikka - 1962 - Ithaca, N.Y.,: Cornell University Press.
Modal Logic: An Introduction.Brian F. Chellas - 1980 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Blindspots.Roy A. Sorensen - 1988 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Blindspots.Roy Sorensen - 1990 - Mind 99 (393):137-140.

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