Emotional intelligence and moral agency: Some worries and a suggestion

Philosophical Psychology 22 (2):143 – 165 (2009)
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Abstract

Emotional intelligence (EI) has been put forward as a distinctive kind of intelligence and, by popularizers such as Daniel Goleman, as an indicator of moral and life skills. Critics, however, have been concerned EI-testing measures conformity or the ability to manipulate own or others' emotions, and relies on a problematic assumption that there are definitive, universal “right” answers when it comes to feelings. Such worries have also been raised about the original concept developed by Peter Salovey and John D. Mayer; that version is the focus here. While it improves on the largely unreflective reliance on particular belief- and value-systems in Goleman's account, however, it does not entirely succeed in being context- and value-neutral. A useful way forward is to apply Ronald de Sousa's notion that emotions are shaped by ideology: this in turn affects attempts to measure any putative “intelligence” with respect to them. Once the ideological dimension is bracketed, a clearer picture of both the usefulness and the limitations of the EI-concept can emerge—and also a better sense of its possible contributions to value theory and moral psychology. The ideological dimension itself may also be unavoidable; squarely facing this possibility is preferable to ignoring it.

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Sophie Rietti
University of Ottawa

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