Why Feminist Epistemology Isn't (And the Implications for Feminist Jurisprudence)

Legal Theory 1 (4):365-400 (1995)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Twenty years ago, when feminism was younger and greener, crides who thought the movement was sinking into a quagmire of unscientific irrationality had a relatively easy time in making out their case. In the first place, many feminists were themselves claiming to have rejected both science and reason, along with morality and all other such male devices for the oppression of women. And, furthermore, this position was a relatively easy one for the skeptical outsider to attack. Unless feminists could say such things as that the present treatment of women was morally wrong, or prevailing ideas about their nature false or unfounded, or traditional reasoning about their position confused or fallacious, it was difficult to see on what basis they could rest the feminist case. And, of course, as they did say such things, all the time, it was obvious that any systematic attempt to reject ethics and rationality was systematically undercut by feminists' own arguments

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,202

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Situating Feminist Epistemology.Louise M. Antony - 2000 - The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 8:31-40.
Feminist jurisprudence: Keeping the subject alive.Jill Marshall - 2006 - Feminist Legal Studies 14 (1):27-51.
Knowing Waste: Towards an Inhuman Epistemology.Myra J. Hird - 2012 - Social Epistemology 26 (3-4):453-469.
Feminist implications of model-based science.Angela Potochnik - 2012 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 43 (2):383-389.

Analytics

Added to PP
2013-12-23

Downloads
65 (#239,555)

6 months
3 (#880,460)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?