Perceptual Expertise and the Autonomy of Perception

Dissertation, University of Michigan (1992)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

According to the received theory of perception, very little information enters the perceptual system as input. Beliefs or theories have to supplement the information to form the perceptual output. This view is the basis for the inferential model of perception and the thesis that perception is theory-laden. ;While such a theory can account for a range of phenomena, it cannot account for perceptual expertise. I offer an alternative theory, which I call the "exploration model of perception." According to such a view, the inferential model of perception is an artifact of experimental design in psychology and a certain conceptualization of the input. First, the experimental design inspired by the received view impoverishes the amount of perceptual information available to the subject--forcing the perceiver to rely on beliefs or theories. For instance, in the standard experiments, the temporal duration of the stimulus is extremely short, compelling the perceiver to rely on beliefs. Second, the interpretation of the experiments misleads us into thinking that all perception is belief-driven. For example, much of contemporary psychology relies on introspective reports as opposed to skilled motor performances. Recent work shows that introspection has access to less perceptual information than our skilled motor performances, so our reports make it appear that the perceiver receives less perceptual information than she actually does, motivating the view that perception is theory-laden or inferential. ;By describing those who are in informationally impoverished settings, the standard psychology of perception has produced theories that are not generally true of perception and, in particular, not true of expert perception. It is a psychology of novice perception. I argue that such a psychology is a product of an epistemological foundationalist tradition. ;The alternative model of perception treats the perceiver as an active agent in the world. The receptors of a moving agent receive information of a different kind than the receptors of a stationary agent. Instead of detecting distal properties , the perceiving agent is monitoring her relationship to the environment . I show how the current empirical literature supports such a view. Perceptual expertise is explained not by the possession of a theory, but by the ability of the agent to exploit the available information. Perceptual expertise is possible because only a small percentage of the available information is being utilized by most perceivers. Finally, I raise some questions concerning how such a theory of perception impacts our epistemology and philosophy of science

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 90,593

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Against Treating Introspection as Perception-Like.Renee Smith - 2010 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 16 (1):79-86.
Representing the impossible.Jennifer Matey - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (2):188 - 206.
An outline of a theory of affordances.Anthony Chemero - 2003 - Ecological Psychology 15 (2):181-195.
Clades, Capgras, and Perceptual Kinds.Jack Lyons - 2005 - Philosophical Topics 33 (1):185-206.
Which Properties Are Represented in Perception.Susanna Siegel - 2005 - In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press. pp. 481-503.
Perceptual Content.Michael George Idinopulos - 1998 - Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley
Perceptual Representation / Perceptual Content.Bence Nanay - 2015 - In Mohan Matthen (ed.), Oxford Handbook for the Philosophy of Perception. Oxford University Press. pp. 153-167.
Naturalized perception without information.John Dilworth - 2004 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 25 (4):349-368.
A Theory of Affect Perception.Edoardo Zamuner - 2011 - Mind and Language 26 (4):436-451.
Embodiment and the Perceptual Hypothesis.William E. S. McNeill - 2012 - Philosophical Quarterly 62 (247):569 - 591.

Analytics

Added to PP
2015-02-06

Downloads
0

6 months
0

Historical graph of downloads

Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references