Abstract

This dissertation examines the so-called 'natural beliefs' discussed by Hume. These include the beliefs in the validity of induction, the existence of objective necessary connections, the existence of external objects, and the existence of a continuing self. Hume holds our natural beliefs to be non-rational, instinctive and without epistemological justification. However, I argue that Hume's naturalist account of human understanding involves a non-epistemological notion of justification on which our natural beliefs are justified because they are natural and instinctive, and "on account of their suitableness and conformity to the mind." This naturalist notion of justification is applied by Hume side by side with his empiricist notion, which he uses to argue that none of our natural beliefs is epistemically justified. Chapter Three argues against the 'New Hume' positions offered by John P. Wright, Galen Strawson and Edward Craig, which purport to show that Hume held our natural beliefs to be true and epistemically justified, but inconsistent with his empiricism. ;The final two chapters concern Hume's naturalist method. Chapter Five argues against the traditional reading of Hume's naturalism as offering an analog in the realm of 'moral' subjects of the system of laws in Newtonian mechanics. Contrary to what a Newtonian science demands, the principles of Hume's science of human nature have exceptions that Hume himself acknowledges. These exceptions, along with the normative attitude Hume exhibits in embracing our natural beliefs, indicate that we should take more seriously the implications of Hume's claim to be an anatomist of the mind. In fact, the method of the science of anatomy closely approximates the method of Hume's science of the mind. The final chapter compares Hume's naturalist account of belief to some twentieth century naturalist accounts