Abstract

In this thesis I develop and apply an essentialist model derived from contemporary modal metaphysics and possible worlds semantics to the Christian doctrine of God. Essentialism as such is neither a doctrine of God nor a doctrine of the divine perfections, but rather a proposal for how we can attribute certain things to God. ;In chapter one, I describe the central themes that guide my study and relate it to the other proposals I consider, discuss "essence" as a theological category, describe what I call "classical theism." In chapter two I introduce and explain modal logic, possible worlds semantics, and essentialism insofar as they are relevant to my proposal. ;In chapter three, I argue that essentialism is both congenial and intrinsic to a Christian understanding of God, and is implied by some core Christian convictions. It provides a coherent way of attributing essential properties to God, while preserving the contingency of creation and the God-world relation. It also recognizes God's real relations to the world and its constituents, without collapsing into a panentheistic view in which the world is one of God's constituents. ;After an initial overview of how one would construe the divine attributes using this model, I consider two important alternative proposals by Karl Barth and Charles Hartshorne in chapters four and five. ;In chapter six I treat two "classical" divine attributes, immutability and simplicity. I argue that my proposal accommodates most of the convictions that have traditionally inspired these doctrines, and that, once qualified, they can be reconciled with my proposal, However, I argue that we should reject the strongest forms of these doctrines because they are incompatible with important Christian beliefs such as the Trinity, Incarnation, divine freedom in creation and the divine "personality." I conclude by suggesting a way in which Christian theism itself buttresses essentialism, via the doctrine of divine ideas