Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (2):146-154 (2003)

Steven L. Reynolds
Arizona State University
Abstract: Hilary Putnam has reformulated his model-theoretic argument as an argument against indirect realism in the philosophy of perception. This new argument is reviewed and defended. Putnam’s new focus on philosophical theories of perception (instead of metaphysical realism) makes better sense of his previous responses to the objection from the causal theory of reference. It is argued that the model-theoretic argument can also be construed as an argument that holders of a causal theory of reference should adopt direct realism in the philosophy of perception.
Keywords Causation  Epistemology  Perception  Realism  Reference  Putnam, H
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DOI 10.1111/1468-0114.00167
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References found in this work BETA

Realism with a Human Face.Hilary Putnam - 1990 - Harvard University Press.
Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology: Volume 2.David Lewis - 1999 - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Reply to David Anderson.Hilary Putnam - 1992 - Philosophical Topics 20 (1).
Realism Without Absolutes.Hilary Putnam - 1993 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 1 (2):179 – 192.

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