Abstract

Critics have suggested that Plato has no consistent, fully developed human psychology. I argue that a full and consistent Platonic view of the human soul does exist within the Platonic canon and that the key to finding it is in the dialogue Timaeus. First, I defend Timaeus from attempts by some commentators such as A. E. Taylor to claim the dialogue does not contain Platonic doctrines. Second, the text of the Timaeus is examined in order to expose and interpret the human psychology found in it. Finally, I briefly compare the psychology found in Timaeus to the views of the human soul found in Phaedo and Republic. From this examination, I conclude that Plato develops the idea of soul as a bridge between his world of perfect being and the visible world of eternal becoming. His human soul is circular motion of the "same" which can be imparted to appropriate matter. This motion is rational, thus allowing the soul to be the seat of cognition. Plato's psychology must ultimately picture the human soul as having an accidental simplicity and thus a non-essential immortality. Plato also has developed a psychology that allows for the soul to have the appearance of priority in order of creation without having an actual first moment of creation. The implications of his psychology on his ethics, his view of the animal world, and theology are examined. The psychology developed from Timaeus resolves difficulties that are alleged to occur in the accounts of the soul found in both Phaedo and the Republic