Synthese 194 (7):2291-2305 (
2017)
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Abstract
In their Every Thing Must Go, Ladyman and Ross defend a novel version of Neo-
Russellian metaphysics of causation, which falls into three claims: (1) there are no
fundamental physical causal facts (orthodox Russellian claim), (2) there are higher-level
causal facts of the special sciences, and (3) higher-level causal facts are explanatorily
emergent. While accepting claims (1) and (2), I attack claim (3). Ladyman and Ross argue
that higher-level causal facts are explanatorily emergent, because (a) certain aspects of
these higher-level facts (their universality) can be captured by renormalization group (RG)
explanations, and (b) RG explanations are not reductive explanations. However, I argue
that RG explanation should be understood as reductive explanations. This result
undermines Ladyman and Ross’s RG-based argument for the explanatory emergence of
higher-level causal facts.