The Limits Of Science (The Pittsburgh-Konstanz Series in the Philosophy and History of Science)

University of California Press (1999)
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Abstract

Perfected science is but an idealization that provides a useful contrast to highlight the limited character of what we do and can attain. This lies at the core of various debates in the philosophy of science and Rescher’s discussion focuses on the question: how far could science go in principle—what are the theoretical limits on science? He concentrates on what science can discover, not what it should discover. He explores in detail the existence of limits or limitations on scientific inquiry, especially those that, in principle, preclude the full realization of the aims of science, as opposed to those that relate to economic obstacles to scientific progress. Rescher also places his argument within the politics of the day, where "strident calls of ideological extremes surround us," ranging from the exaggeration that "science can do anything"—to the antiscientism that views science as a costly diversion we would be well advised to abandon. Rescher offers a middle path between these two extremes and provides an appreciation of the actual powers and limitations of science, not only to philosophers of science but also to a larger, less specialized audience.

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Nicholas Rescher
University of Pittsburgh

Citations of this work

Is there a fundamental level?Jonathan Schaffer - 2003 - Noûs 37 (3):498–517.
A New Functional Approach to Scientific Progress.Yafeng Shan - 2019 - Philosophy of Science 86 (4):739-758.
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Process Philosophy.Johanna Seibt - 2013 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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