The Logic of Relativism

Increasingly Skeptical Publications (2013)
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Abstract

This in-depth study aims to develop a rigorous analysis of the nature and the logic of relativism in general as a basis for evaluating the charge of self-refutation against relativism. It develops a general definition of relativism that distinguishes relativism from structurally similar notions such as conventionalism and contextualism. On the basis of this definition, it formulates a series of logical systems that each might be presented as candidates for the logic of relativism. Each system is evaluated to see whether it can sustain the charge of self-refutation. The result is that one of these systems can be proven not to be self-refuting, even under increasingly stronger challenges. Consequently, this study argues that even global relativism can be demonstrated not to refute itself, despite the long history of arguments to the contrary.

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Mark Ressler
University of Melbourne (PhD)

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