On the Truth-Relevancy of the Pragmatic Utility of Beliefs

Review of Metaphysics 28 (3):443 - 452 (1975)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This position is not confined to the philosophical pragmatists of yore. More recent methodologists of science have reacted to Rudolf Carnap’s thesis that science can dispense with accepting hypotheses as true by maintaining that scientists do accept hypotheses, albeit on practical rather than theoretical grounds. On the position adopted by this school of thought, "accepting a hypothesis as true" is to be reinterpreted to amount to "acting or being disposed to act in the manner which would be best relative to a given objective." Accordingly, such theorists propose in effect to reconstrue acceptability-as-true in terms of successful action.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 106,506

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2011-05-29

Downloads
30 (#836,715)

6 months
5 (#851,853)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author Profiles

Nicholas Rescher
University of Pittsburgh
Tom Vinci
Dalhousie University

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references