Modal models for bradwardine's theory of truth

Review of Symbolic Logic 1 (2):225-240 (2008)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Stephen Read (2002, 2006) has recently discussed Bradwardine's theory of truth and defended it as an appropriate way to treat paradoxes such as the liar. In this paper, I discuss Read's formalisation of Bradwardine's theory of truth and provide a class of models for this theory. The models facilitate comparison of Bradwardine's theory with contemporary theories of truth

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,322

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
47 (#328,587)

6 months
7 (#411,145)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Greg Restall
University of Melbourne

References found in this work

The logic of paradox.Graham Priest - 1979 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 8 (1):219 - 241.
Truth.Paul Horwich - 1999 - In Meaning. Oxford University Press. pp. 261-272.
A Prosentential theory of truth.Dorothy L. Grover, Joseph L. Camp & Nuel D. Belnap - 1975 - Philosophical Studies 27 (1):73--125.

View all 14 references / Add more references