Mind and Matter

Idealistic Studies 40 (1-2):1-14 (2010)
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Abstract

The ancient problem of mind-matter relationship still has traction. Cartesian dualism created a seemingly impossible divide here. But with the decline of mechanism on the matter sides the issue of trans-categorical causality no larger secured insurmountable. However, with a more open concept of causality in view, there is no reason to think that the causality at issue here is a one way street from matter to mind. The mind-brain can be seen as a unified hermeneutical engine that permits of two-way operation. Mark Twain asked “When the body is drunk, does the mind stay sober?” But one may just as well ask “When the mind says ‘Write!,’ does the hand remain immobile?”

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Nicholas Rescher
University of Pittsburgh

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