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Do scientific aims justify methodological rules?
Erkenntnis 38 (2):223 - 232 (1993)
Abstract
According to a popular view of scientific methodology, scientific methods are prescriptive rules (methodological rules) which are justified in so far as they realize or promote the aims of science. This paper considers several different interpretations of the phrase aims of science, arguing that none of these interpretations allow aims to provide a satisfactory justification of methodological rules.Author's Profile
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Citations of this work
A Pragmatic Approach To The Demarcation Problem.David B. Resnik - 2000 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 31 (2):249-267.
Truthlikeness, Rationality and Scientific Method.Jesus P. Zamora Bonilla - 2000 - Synthese 122 (3):321-335.
Economics and Laudan's normative naturalism: Bad news from instrumental rationality's front line.D. Wade Hands - 1996 - Social Epistemology 10 (2):137 – 152.
References found in this work
The Scientific Image.William Demopoulos & Bas C. van Fraassen - 1982 - Philosophical Review 91 (4):603.
The Enterprise of Knowledge: An Essay on Knowledge, Credal Probability, and Chance.Isaac Levi - 1980 - MIT Press.
Science and Values: The Aims of Science and Their Role in Scientific Debate.Larry Laudan - 1984 - University of California Press.
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