Wittgenstein’s Ladder: The Tractatus and Nonsense

Philosophical Investigations 21 (2):97–151 (1998)
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Abstract

I discuss some reservations about the exegetical power of the claim that the Tractatus is “anti-metaphysical.” The “resolute” reading has the virtue of fidelity to important and neglected features of the work, both its anti-metaphysical moves and its account of the nature of the activity of philosophy and its status. However, its proponents underestimate the barriers to maintaining a consistent fidelity to these features of the text. The image of a ladder suggests a mere instrumental means to arrive at a place that can itself be characterized independently of our means of arrival; where we arrive via the process of the TLP is the conclusion of an argument, and so cannot be characterized independently of the argument that got us there. In his commitments about the process of logical analysis “within language,” he strives as much as in his statements about the world to return us to our ordinary ways of talking and making sense of what we say to one another. Given the internal relationship Wittgenstein is at pains to emphasize between language, thought, and reality, he could hardly have philosophical commitments about one of these terms (have a residual metaphysics of language) and isolate this from how he thinks about the others. In a discussion of “Senator, you’re no Jack Kennedy” and “Chairman Mao is rare,” I argue that, pace Conant and Diamond’s claims to the contrary, logical categories are being invoked to explain why one cannot mean what one thinks one means in this phrase, and that Wittgenstein is both more anti-metaphysical in his treatment of these logical categories (in contrast with Frege) than the resolute readers consider him to be, and less successful in his treatment of how logical categories rule our judgments of sense and nonsense than they imply he is. Finally, I question the sharp boundary between logic and psychology and the “claustrophobic” feel that is created by a narrow construal of what one can make sense of in another’s words and person that underwrites their account of nonsense via a conflict between the meaning words can contain and our confused desires. Throughout, I discuss relevant passages of the Investigations that resolute readers treat as a re-expression of the themes of the Tractatus, to contrast the “anti-metaphysical” treatment these themes express in the Tractatus with the less dogmatic treatment they receive in the Investigations.

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Lynette Reid
Dalhousie University

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