Logos and Episteme 6 (4):429-448 (2015)
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Abstract |
According to moral testimony pessimists, the testimony of moral experts does not provide non-experts with normative reasons for belief. Moral testimony optimists hold that it does. We first aim to show that moral testimony optimism is, to the extent such things may be shown, the more natural view about moral testimony. Speaking roughly, the supposed discontinuity between the norms of moral beliefs and the norms of non-moral beliefs, on careful reflection, lacks the intuitive advantage that it is sometimes supposed to have. Our second aim is to highlight the difference in the nature of the pragmatic reasons for belief that support moral testimony optimism and moral testimony pessimism, setting out more clearly the nature and magnitude of the challenge for the pessimist.
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Keywords | moral deference moral testimony reasons for belief ethics of belief pragmatic reasons for belief theoretical reason moral reasoning moral reasons moral epistemology evidentialism |
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Reprint years | 2015 |
ISBN(s) | 2069-0533 |
DOI | 10.5840/logos-episteme20156434 |
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References found in this work BETA
What is Wrong with Moral Testimony?Robert Hopkins - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (3):611-634.
The Puzzle of Pure Moral Deference.Sarah McGrath - 2009 - Philosophical Perspectives 23 (1):321-344.
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Citations of this work BETA
Pragmatic Reasons for Belief.Andrew Reisner - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. Oxford University Press.
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