Religious Studies 14 (1):27 - 34 (1978)

Authors
Bruce Reichenbach
Augsburg College
Abstract
Two objections have been raised against the re-creationist thesis that the individual human person can be re-created after death. The objection that the re-created person would not be the same person as the deceased because he would lack spatial-temporal continuity with that person I answer by showing that spatial-temporal continuity with that person is not a necessary condition for all cases of personal identity. To the objection that the decision to call the re-created individual the same as the deceased either uses criteria like memory which themselves presuppose bodily continuity or is merely an unjustified convention, I show that these criteria do not presuppose continuity, and through a decision is called for, it is not an unjustifiable or arbitrary decision.
Keywords personal identity  immortality  embodyment  monism  re-creation  spatial-temporal continuity
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DOI 10.1017/S0034412500010465
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