In Timothy Chan (ed.), The Aim of Belief. Oxford University Press. pp. 167-183 (2013)

Andrew Reisner
Uppsala University
This paper argues that both a limited doxastic voluntarism and anti-evidentialism are consistent with the views that the aim of belief is truth or knowledge and that this aim plays an important role in norm-setting for beliefs. More cautiously, it argues that limited doxastic voluntarism is (or would be) a useful capacity for agents concerned with truth tracking to possess, and that having it would confer some straightforward benefits of both an epistemic and non-epistemic variety to an agent concerned with truth tracking.
Keywords Evidentialism  Doxastic Voluntarism  Ethics of Belief  Theoretical Reasons  Reasons  Rationality  Aim of Belief  Theoretical Reason  Permissivism  Epistemic Permissivism
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