In Timothy Chan (ed.), The Aim of Belief. Oxford University Press. pp. 167-183 (2013)
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| Abstract |
This paper argues that both a limited doxastic voluntarism and anti-evidentialism are consistent with the views that the aim of belief is truth or knowledge and that this aim plays an important role in norm-setting for beliefs. More cautiously, it argues that limited doxastic voluntarism is (or would be) a useful capacity for agents concerned with truth tracking to possess, and that having it would confer some straightforward benefits of both an epistemic and non-epistemic variety to an agent concerned with truth tracking.
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| Keywords | Evidentialism Doxastic Voluntarism Ethics of Belief Theoretical Reasons Reasons Rationality Aim of Belief Theoretical Reason Permissivism Epistemic Permissivism |
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| Reprint years | 2013 |
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Pragmatic Reasons for Belief.Andrew Reisner - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. Oxford University Press.
Another Argument Against Uniqueness.Thomas Raleigh - 2017 - Philosophical Quarterly 67 (267):327-346.
In Defence of Instrumentalism About Epistemic Normativity.Christopher Cowie - 2014 - Synthese 191 (16):4003-4017.
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