Deep ecology and the irrelevance of morality

Environmental Ethics 18 (4):411-424 (1996)
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Abstract

Both Arne Naess and Warwick Fox have argued that deep ecology, in terms of “Selfrealization,” is essentially nonmoral. I argue that the attainment of the ecological Self does not render morality in the richest sense “superfluous,” as Fox suggests. To the contrary, the achievement of the ecological Self is a precondition for being a truly moral person, both from the perspective of a robust Kantian moral frameworkand from the perspective of Aristotelian virtue ethics. The opposition between selfregard and morality is a false one. The two are the same. The ecological philosophy of Naess and Fox is an environmental ethic in the grand tradition of moral philosophy

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Eric Reitan
Oklahoma State University

Citations of this work

On “Self-Realization” – The Ultimate Norm of Arne Naess’s Ecosophy T.Md Munir Hossain Talukder - 2016 - Symposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 3 (2):219-235.
The moral status of non-human beings and their ecosystems.Michel Dion - 2000 - Ethics, Place and Environment 3 (2):221 – 229.
The moral status of non‐human beings and their ecosystems.Michel Dion - 2000 - Philosophy and Geography 3 (2):221-229.

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