A problem for the doctrine of double effect

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 98 (2):217–223 (1998)
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Abstract

The Doctrine of Double Effect has been defended not only as a test of character but also as a criterion of wrongness for action. This paper criticises one attempt to justify the doctrine in the latter capacity. The justification, first proposed by Warren Quinn, traces the wrongness of intending harm as a means to the objectionable features of certain reasons for making this our intention. As I argue, however, some of the actions which seem to us to be permissible, and whose permissibility the DDE is supposed to explain, can be performed for these objectionable reasons. Since the proposed justification implies that any action is wrong when performed for these reasons, it renders the DDE incapable of accommodating the very intuitions about action which its proponents would have it explain

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Sophia Reibetanz Moreau
University of Toronto, St. George Campus

Citations of this work

Doctrine of double effect.Alison McIntyre - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Three Cheers for Double Effect.Dana Kay Nelkin & Samuel C. Rickless - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (1):125-158.
Three Cheers for Double Effect.Samuel C. Rickless Dana Kay Nelkin - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (1):125-158.

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