Faith and Philosophy 31 (2):181-203 (2014)

Eric Reitan
Oklahoma State University
Richard Swinburne’s formulation of the argument from evil is representative of a pervasive way of understanding the challenge evil poses for theistic belief. But there is an error in Swinburne’s formulation : he fails to consider possible deontological constraints on God’s legitimate responses to evil. To demonstrate the error’s significance, I show that some important objections to Swinburne’s theodicy admit of a novel answer once we correct for Swinburne’s Lapse. While more is needed to show that the resultant “deontological theodicy” succeeds, its promise highlights the significance of Swinburne’s Lapse and the prospects for theodicy it has obscured
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DOI 10.5840/faithphil2014578
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References found in this work BETA

The Persistent Problem of Evil.Bruce Russell - 1989 - Faith and Philosophy 6 (2):121-139.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Non-Consequentialist Argument From Evil.Justin Mooney - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-17.
Divine Intentions and the Problem of Evil.Justin Mooney - 2019 - Religious Studies 55 (2):1-20.

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