Abstract

The dissertation develops a deontological externalism, on which S is epistemically justified in believing that p just in case it is false that S epistemically ought not to believe that p. ;Chapter 1 considers and rejects a proposal that epistemology ought to abandon the traditional project of analyzing epistemic justification. Chapter 2 provides testimonial support for the deontological conception, and provides argumentation against the strongest competing conception, which is the truth-conducive conception. ;Chapter 3 treats the subjects of internalism and externalism. Although the deontic account has traditionally been cast as an internalist view, I argue that the deontic account is best understood as an externalist view of epistemic justification. I also explain how the deontic account accommodates the standard counterexamples to externalism. ;The next two chapters deal with objections. Chapter 4 treats the objection that we should reject the deontic account ought because it entails the implausible doctrine of doxastic voluntarism . ;Chapter 5 considers three versions of the general objection that we should reject the deontic account because it does not provide a connection between epistemic justification and truth. ;Chapter 6 and 7 place epistemic justification within a larger epistemological context. Chapter 6 critically examines some arguments for thinking that epistemic justification is a component of knowledge, and it briefly considers whether any of these arguments support objections against deontic externalism. Chapter 7 develops the "integration problem" in epistemology. This is the problem of how we are to account for a multiplicity of properties that are all desirable or significant from the epistemic point of view. ;Finally, a concluding section briefly summarizes the case for deontic externalism