Who Knows?

In Miguel Ángel Fernández Vargas (ed.), Performance Epistemology: Foundations and Applications. New York, NY: Oxford University Press UK (2016)
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Abstract

This chapter traces the significance of a common feature of action and knowledge. A successful analysis of action must capture the sense in which there is someone who is acting. Similarly, it is argued, a successful analysis of knowledge must capture the sense in which there is someone who knows. Explicitly recognizing this fact helps to explain the importance of epistemic agency in understanding what knowledge is. This chapter explores the connections between knowledge, agency, and personhood and argues that some of the most widely shared intuitions in epistemology can be grounded in the sense that knowledge belongs to persons. The chapter comments on the way in which a claim of this sort has been taken up by virtue epistemology, as well as the difficulties we face in providing a full understanding of how knowledge can belong to persons. The chapter closes with a consideration of the value of knowledge.

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Baron Reed
Northwestern University

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Agency of belief and intention.A. K. Flowerree - 2017 - Synthese 194 (8):2763-2784.

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