Self‐Knowledge and Rationality

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (1):164-181 (2009)
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Abstract

There have been several recent attempts to account for the special authority of self‐knowledge by grounding it in a constitutive relation between an agent’s intentional states and her judgments about those intentional states. This constitutive relation is said to hold in virtue of the rationality of the subject. I argue, however, that there are two ways in which we have self‐knowledge without there being such a constitutive relation between first‐order intentional states and the second‐order judgments about them. Recognition of this fact thus represents a significant challenge to the rational agency view.

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Baron Reed
Northwestern University

Citations of this work

Self-Knowledge.Brie Gertler - 2015 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
The silence of self-knowledge.Johannes Roessler - 2013 - Philosophical Explorations 16 (1):1-17.
XIII—Self‐Knowledge, Transparency, and Self‐Authorship.Sacha Golob - 2015 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 115 (3pt3):235-253.
Semantic Knowledge, Semantic Guidance, and Kripke's Wittgenstein.Derek Green - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (2):186-206.
Self-knowledge and the Paradox of Belief Revision.Giovanni Merlo - 2022 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 13 (1):65-83.

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