Self-knowledge and rationality

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (1):164-181 (2009)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

There have been several recent attempts to account for the special authority of self-knowledge by grounding it in a constitutive relation between an agent's intentional states and her judgments about those intentional states. This constitutive relation is said to hold in virtue of the rationality of the subject. I argue, however, that there are two ways in which we have self-knowledge without there being such a constitutive relation between first-order intentional states and the second-order judgments about them. Recognition of this fact thus represents a significant challenge to the rational agency view

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,271

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
189 (#100,961)

6 months
23 (#113,995)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Baron Reed
Northwestern University

Citations of this work

Self-Knowledge and the Transparency of Belief.Brie Gertler - 2008 - In Anthony Hatzimoysis (ed.), Self-Knowledge. Oxford University Press.
Self-Consciousness.Joel Smith - 2017 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
The silence of self-knowledge.Johannes Roessler - 2013 - Philosophical Explorations 16 (1):1-17.
XIII—Self‐Knowledge, Transparency, and Self‐Authorship.Sacha Golob - 2015 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 115 (3pt3):235-253.
Semantic Knowledge, Semantic Guidance, and Kripke's Wittgenstein.Derek Green - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (2):186-206.

View all 8 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford: Oxford University Press. Edited by John Henry McDowell.
Theory of knowledge.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1966 - Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,: Prentice-Hall.
Doxastic deliberation.Nishi Shah & J. David Velleman - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (4):497-534.

View all 10 references / Add more references