Fallibilism and the Lottery paradox

Abstract

Any theory of knowledge that is fallibilist—i.e., that allows for one to have knowledge that could have been false or accidentally true—faces the lottery paradox. The paradox arises from the combination of two plausible claims: first, no one can know that one’s lottery ticket will lose prior to learning that it in fact has lost, and, second, the justification one has for the belief that one’s ticket will lose is just as good as the justification one has for paradigmatic instances of knowledge. In thispaper, I offer a solution to the lottery paradox that is grounded in a thorough-going acceptance of fallibilism

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Baron Reed
Northwestern University

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