Analysis 74 (1):69-74 (2014)

Authors
Clea F. Rees
Cardiff University
Abstract
I argue that lying is generally morally better than mere deliberate misleading because the latter involves the exploitation of a greater trust and more seriously abuses our willingness to fulfil epistemic and moral obligations to others. Whereas the liar relies on our figuring out and accepting only what is asserted, the mere deliberate misleader depends on our actively inferring meaning beyond what is said in the form of conversational implicatures as well. When others’ epistemic and moral obligations are determined by standard assumptions of communicative cooperation and no compelling moral reason justifies mere deliberate misleading instead, one had better lie.
Keywords deception  epistemic  lying  misleading  moral  obligation  trust
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DOI 10.1093/analys/ant104
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References found in this work BETA

Liar!Jonathan Webber - 2013 - Analysis 73 (4):651-659.
Just Go Ahead and Lie.J. Saul - 2012 - Analysis 72 (1):3-9.
The Distinctive Wrong in Lying.Alan Strudler - 2010 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13 (2):171-179.

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Citations of this work BETA

Lying, Risk and Accuracy.Sam Fox Krauss - 2017 - Analysis 77 (4):726-734.
Assertion, Lying, and Untruthfully Implicating.Jessica Pepp - 2019 - In Sanford C. Goldberg (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Assertion. Oxford University Press.
To Lie or to Mislead?Felix Timmermann & Emanuel Viebahn - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (5):1481-1501.
The Aesthetic Significance of the Lying-Misleading Distinction.Jessica Pepp - 2019 - British Journal of Aesthetics 59 (3):289-304.

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