The metaphysics of original sin
In Peter Van Inwagen & Dean Zimmerman (eds.), Persons: Human and Divine. Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press ;. pp. 319--356 (2007)
AbstractThis paper argues that there is no straightforward conflict between the traditional Christian doctrine of original sin and the thesis that a person P is morally responsible for the obtaining of a state of affairs S only if S obtains (or obtained) and P could have prevented S from obtaining.
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads
References found in this work
No references found.
Citations of this work
How to Apply Molinism to the Theological Problem of Moral Luck.Robert J. Hartman - 2014 - Faith and Philosophy 31 (1):68-90.
Original Sin and a Broad Free Will Defense.W. Paul Franks - 2012 - Philosophia Christi 14 (2):353–371.
Preparing the Ground for Kant’s Highest Good in the World.Wolfgang Ertl - 2021 - Philosophia 49 (5):1837-1852.
Should Christians Be Worried About Situationist Claims in Psychology and Philosophy?Christian B. Miller - 2016 - Faith and Philosophy 33 (1):48-73.
Similar books and articles
Moral Personality, Perversity, and Original Sin.James Wetzel - 1995 - Journal of Religious Ethics 23 (1):3 - 25.
The Anxiety of Inheritance: Reinhold Niebuhr and the Literal Truth of Original Sin.Geoffrey Rees - 2003 - Journal of Religious Ethics 31 (1):75 - 99.
The First and the Second Adam: Reflections on James Wetzel's Reformulation of a Doctrine.Gilbert Meilaender - 1995 - Journal of Religious Ethics 23 (1):27 - 33.
Julian of Norwich: Problems of Evil and the Seriousness of Sin.Marilyn McCord Adams - 2011 - Philosophia 39 (3):433-447.