Degrees of Truth versus Intuitionism

Analysis 49 (1):31 - 32 (1989)
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Abstract

The purpose of this article is to compare the theory that there are degrees of truth with putnam's intuitionist theory as rival solutions to the sorites paradox. I argue that intuitionist logic lacks explanatory support and is self-Defeating. The degree theory on the other hand offers an illuminating explanation of the sorites fallacy

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10.1093/analys/49.1.31

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Citations of this work

Intuitionism and the Modal Logic of Vagueness.Susanne Bobzien & Ian Rumfitt - 2020 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 49 (2):221-248.

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