Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 34 (4):71-92 (2020)

Sushruth Ravish
Indian Institute of Technology, Bombay
The current discourse on moral epistemology (ME), has hardly paid any attention to the question concerning the demarcation of the domain of ME within epistemology. Neither is the subject matter of ME considered unique, nor is the methodology adopted in its investigations considered distinct. We attempt to show in this paper that this omission does not restrict itself to a mere taxonomical oversight but rather leads to certain deeper conceptual concerns. We argue that a casual and porous understanding of the subject matter of ME is the result of conflating moral beliefs and justification with non-moral beliefs and justification. If ME doesn't merit a clear demarcation within epistemology, then the very legitimacy of ME is brought under a cloud, thereby threatening the distinction between ethics and epistemology. We believe G. E Moore foresaw this predicament and our interpretation of his work could offer a possible solution.
Keywords Moral epistemology  Moore's non-naturalism  Moral justification  Empirical moral epistemology  Non-empirical moral epistemology
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References found in this work BETA

How to Be a Moral Realist.Richard Boyd - 1988 - In G. Sayre-McCord (ed.), Essays on Moral Realism. Cornell University Press. pp. 181-228.
Moral Skepticisms.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2006 - Oxford University Press.
Moral Explanations.Nicholas Sturgeon - 1985 - In James Rachels (ed.), Ethical Theory 1: The Question of Objectivity. Oxford University Press.
Moral Knowledge and Ethical Character.Robert Audi - 1997 - Oxford University Press.

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