What is Touch?

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (3):413 - 432 (2012)
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Abstract

This paper addresses the nature of touch or ?tactual perception?. I argue that touch encompasses a wide range of perceptual achievements, that treating it as a number of separate senses will not work, and that the permissive conception we are left with is so permissive that it is unclear how touch might be distinguished from the other senses. I conclude that no criteria will succeed in individuating touch. Although I do not rule out the possibility that this also applies to other senses, I suggest that the heterogeneity of touch makes it both distinctive and particularly problematic

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Matthew Ratcliffe
University of York

References found in this work

Phenomenal Consciousness: A Naturalistic Theory.Peter Carruthers - 2000 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Perception and the Reach of Phenomenal Content.Tim Bayne - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236):385-404.

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