Emotional Intentionality

Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 85:251-269 (2019)
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Abstract

This paper sketches an account of what distinguishes emotional intentionality from other forms of intentionality. I focus on the ‘two-sided’ structure of emotional experience. Emotions such as being afraid of something and being angry about something involve intentional states with specific contents. However, experiencing an entity, event, or situation in a distinctively emotional way also includes a wider-ranging disturbance of the experiential world within which the object of emotion is encountered. I consider the nature of this disturbance and its relationship to the localized content of an emotional experience.

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Matthew Ratcliffe
University of York

References found in this work

Emotions as Attitudes.Julien A. Deonna & Fabrice Teroni - 2015 - Dialectica 69 (3):293-311.
What an emotion is: A sketch.Robert C. Roberts - 1988 - Philosophical Review 97 (April):183-209.
Emotions as Evaluative Feelings.Bennett W. Helm - 2009 - Emotion Review 1 (3):248--55.
Emotions, feelings and intentionality.Peter Goldie - 2002 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1 (3):235-254.

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