De Se Puzzles, the Knowledge Argument, and the Formation of Internal Knowledge

Analysis and Metaphysics 11:106-132 (2012)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

ABSTRACT. Thought experiments about de se attitudes and Jackson’s original Knowledge Argument are compared with each other and discussed from the perspective of a computational theory of mind. It is argued that internal knowledge, i.e. knowledge formed on the basis of signals that encode aspects of their own processing rather than being intentionally directed towards external objects, suffices for explaining the seminal puzzles without resorting to acquaintance or phenomenal character as primitive notions. Since computationalism is ontologically neutral, the account also explains why neither Lewis’s two gods nor Mary’s surprise in the Knowledge Argument violate physicalism.

Links

PhilArchive

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Acquaintance with qualia.John Bigelow & Robert Pargetter - 1990 - Theoria 61 (3):129-147.
Phenomenal knowledge.Earl Conee - 1994 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (2):136-150.
Re-acquaintance with qualia.John Bigelow & Robert Pargetter - 2006 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (3):353 – 378.
Our knowledge of the internal world.Robert Stalnaker - 2008 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Why the Ability Hypothesis is best forgotten.Sam Coleman - 2009 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (2-3):74-97.
Mary’s Scientific Knowledge.Luca Malatesti - 2008 - Prolegomena 7 (1):37-59.
Knowing what it is like and knowing how.Luca Malatesti - 2004 - In Alberto Peruzzi (ed.), Mind and Causality. John Benjamins. pp. 55--119.
Knowledge and the internal revisited.John Mcdowell - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (1):97-105.
Jackson's apostasy.William S. Robinson - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 111 (3):277-293.

Analytics

Added to PP
2013-04-05

Downloads
447 (#39,394)

6 months
60 (#63,740)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Erich Rast
New University of Lisbon

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references