Philosophy 95 (3):309-335 (2020)

Authors
Madeleine Ransom
University of British Columbia, Okanagan
Abstract
Does the scope of beliefs that people can form on the basis of perception remain fixed, or can it be amplified with learning? The answer to this question is important for our understanding of why and when we ought to trust experts, and also for assessing the plausibility of epistemic foundationalism. The empirical study of perceptual expertise suggests that experts can indeed enrich their perceptual experiences through learning. Yet this does not settle the epistemic status of their beliefs. One might hold that the background knowledge of experts is the cause of their enriched perceptual experience – what is known as cognitive permeation – and so their subsequent beliefs are only mediately justified because they are epistemically dependent on this background knowledge. I argue against this view. Perceptual expertise is not the result of cognitive permeation but is rather the result of perceptual learning, and perceptual learning does not involve cognition in a way that entails cognitive permeation. Perceptual expertise thus provides a means of widening the scope of the immediately justified beliefs that experts can form.
Keywords perceptual learning  foundationalism  cognitive penetration  perceptual justification  expertise  immediate justification
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Cognitive Penetrability of Perception.Dustin Stokes - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (7):646-663.

View all 27 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Do Looks Constitute Our Perceptual Evidence?Harmen Ghijsen - 2020 - Philosophical Issues 30 (1):132-147.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

On Perceptual Expertise.Dustin Stokes - 2021 - Mind and Language 36 (2):241-263.
The Epistemic Significance of Perceptual Learning.Elijah Chudnoff - 2018 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 61 (5-6):520-542.
Attentional Weighting in Perceptual Learning.Madeleine Ransom - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (7-8):236-248.
How Perception Generates, Preserves, and Mediates Justification.Bartek Chomanski & Elijah Chudnoff - 2018 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 61 (5-6):559-568.
Against a “Mindless” Account of Perceptual Expertise.Amit Chaturvedi - 2019 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 18 (3):509-531.
The Real Epistemic Significance of Perceptual Learning.Berit Brogaard & Dimitria Electra Gatzia - 2018 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 61 (5-6):543-558.
The Real Epistemic Problem of Cognitive Penetration.Harmen Ghijsen - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (6):1457-1475.
Cognitive Penetrability and Ethical Perception.Robert Cowan - 2014 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):665-682.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2020-05-22

Total views
251 ( #43,727 of 2,505,691 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
46 ( #18,885 of 2,505,691 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes