Williamson’s Argument Against the KK-Principle 157

The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 1 (2005)
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Abstract

Timothy Williamson (2000 ch. 5) presents a reductio against the luminosity of knowing, against, that is, the so-called KK-principle: if one knows p, then one knows (or is at least in a position to know) that one knows p.1 I do not endorse the principle, but I do not think Williamson’s argument succeeds in refuting it. My aim here is to show that the KK-principle is not the most obvious culprit behind the contradiction Williamson derives.

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Murali Ramachandran
University of Witwatersrand

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