Contemporary Pragmatism 1 (2):1-63 (2004)

Authors
Bjørn Ramberg
University of Oslo
Abstract
Following Quine, Davidson, and Dennett, I take mental states and linguistic meaning to be individuated with reference to interpretation. The regulative principle of ideal interpretation is to maximize rationality, and this accounts for the distinctiveness and autonomy of the vocabulary of agency. This rationality-maxim can accommodate empirical cognitive-psychological investigation into the nature and limitations of human mental processing. Interpretivism is explicitly anti-reductionist, but in the context of Rorty's neo-pragmatism provides a naturalized view of agents. The interpretivist strategy affords a less despondent view of constructive philosophical activity than Rorty's own.
Keywords Epistemology  Interpretation  Linguistics  Mental Process  Mental States  Pragmatism  Richard Rorty
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DOI 10.1163/18758185-90000140
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References found in this work BETA

Word and Object.Willard Van Orman Quine - 1960 - Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press.
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature.Richard Rorty - 1979 - Princeton University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Rorty's Debt to Sellarsian Metaphysics.Carl B. Sachs - 2013 - Metaphilosophy 44 (5):682-707.
Redescribing Final Vocabularies.Mauro Santelli - 2020 - European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy 12 (1).

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