Knowledge-to-Fact Arguments (Bootstrapping, Closure, Paradox and KK)

Analysis 76 (2):142-149 (2016)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The leading idea of this article is that one cannot acquire knowledge of any non-epistemic fact by virtue of knowing that one that knows something. The lines of reasoning involved in the surprise exam paradox and in Williamson’s _reductio_ of the KK-principle, which demand that one can, are thereby undermined, and new type of counter-example to epistemic closure emerges.

Categories

Keywords

Reprint years

DOI

10.1093/analys/anw018

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,349

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

My notes

Similar books and articles

Justification before knowledge?E. J. Coffman - manuscript
Knowing by way of tracking and epistemic closure.Murali Ramachandran - 2015 - Analysis 75 (2):217-223.
Epistemic Logic and Epistemology.Wesley H. Holliday - 2018 - In Sven Ove Hansson Vincent F. Hendricks (ed.), Handbook of Formal Philosophy. Springer. pp. 351-369.
Epistemic Contrastivism, Knowledge and Practical Reasoning.Peter Baumann - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (1):59-68.
Rules for reasoning from knowledge and lack of knowledge.Douglas Walton - 2006 - Philosophia 34 (3):355-376.
Restricting factiveness.Fredrik Stjernberg - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 146 (1):29 - 48.
Dispositional Knowledge-how versus Propositional Knowledge-that.Gregor Damschen - 2009 - In Gregor Damschen, Robert Schnepf & Karsten Stueber (eds.), Debating Dispositions. Issues in Metaphysics, Epistemology and Philosophy of Mind. Berlin/New York: de Gruyter. pp. 278-295.
The Paradox of the Knower without Epistemic Closure -- Corrected.C. B. Cross - 2012 - Mind 121 (482):457-466.
Knowing the Facts.Mark Textor - 2011 - Dialectica 65 (1):75-86.
On Williamson's arguments that knowledge is a mental state.Adam Leite - 2005 - Ratio 18 (2):165–175.
Knowledge first?E. J. Coffman - unknown
The paradox of the knower without epistemic closure.Charles B. Cross - 2001 - Mind 110 (438):319-333.
Knowing How Without Knowing That.Yuri Cath - 2011 - In John Bengson & Mark Moffett (eds.), Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action. Oxford University Press. pp. 113.
Knowing How and Epistemic Injustice.Katherine Hawley - 2011 - In John Bengson & Marc A. Moffett (eds.), Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action. Oxford University Press. pp. 283-99.
Epistemic closure under deductive inference: what is it and can we afford it?Assaf Sharon & Levi Spectre - 2013 - Synthese 190 (14):2731-2748.

Analytics

Added to PP
2016-03-22

Downloads
160 (#116,147)

6 months
15 (#157,754)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Murali Ramachandran
University of Witwatersrand

Citations of this work

Add more citations

References found in this work

Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210):105-116.
Reflective knowledge.Ernest Sosa - 2009 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Conclusive reasons.Fred I. Dretske - 1971 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 49 (1):1-22.
Basic knowledge and the problem of easy knowledge.Stewart Cohen - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2):309-329.

View all 19 references / Add more references